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Some Comments on the 
Relations between Cuba and the EU
1
 
 
Karl Buck 
 
1. This article, based on twenty years of experience with the issue in the EU Council of Ministers, 
gives a short overview of the evolution of  relations,  major events, chances and obstacles. I 
consider such an effort necessary since recently, from various political backgrounds not just in 
Cuba, statements are made which in my view are based on incorrect or incomplete knowledge, or 
on ideological  considerations which do the EU policy no justice. Politics are politics – but 
distorting facts is never a good base. 
In particular, I contest affirmations by “friends of Cuba” like:  
- the EU is “dependent of the US policy towards Cuba” 
-  the EU has “accepted the interventionist US policy in favour of the transatlantic 
partnership” 
- the Common Position of the EU tries to force system change in Cuba”
2
 
 
        Ideological positions are always more at ease with black-and white visions than with the 
usually more complex real world which requests more thorough analysis but offers also more 
possible ways out of challenges. At times, Cuban authorities were more pragmatic than their 
followers in Europe or LA. 
 
2. Besides ideological “escaramuzas”, it has become fashionable, by a strange coalition of Cuban 
and EU hardliners as well as by some European analysts
3
 
 favourable to closer relations (les 
extrèmes se touchent), to (mis-)interpret the Common Position of the EU ( hereafter referred to as 
CP)  as essentially “conditioning”, an obstacle, inappropriate  or superfluous. Cuba and its 
“frontline NGOs”, but also such analysts meanwhile request the  elimination of the CP as 
condition for or step towards negotiations on contractual relations. I shall deal with this at the 
end. 
3.  Mainly due to Cuba’s geographical situation, relations and cooperation with Cuba have 
particular features and fate, with considerable political influence. A Cuba situated in the Indian 
Ocean would probably stand a chance to be seen as one of the EU’s  less problematic ACP 
partners. The US policy towards Cuba is important, but the transatlantic partnership has not 
prevented the EU or most of its member states (MS) to make their own analysis, and to act in 
accordance with their own norms, interests and capacities. Divergent national positions are 
simply to be expected in a community of 27 with considerably varying political systems and 
historical background. Assessment and changes of  US policies show similar divergence and 
evolution, including  positions and influence of the Cuban exile community: economic interests 
forced President G.W. Bush  to allow US agricultural exports to Cuba. 
        The collapse of communism had dramatic impact on Cuba’s economy and daily life.  Soviet 
aid to Cuba between 1960 and 1990 is estimated at 65 billion $. It was mostly free, and only 0.6% 
of loans was repaid. The Club of Paris calculates the Cuban debt at 380% of its exports, an 
                                                            
    
1 Disclaimer: From 1990- 2009, the author was in charge of relations with Latin America and Cuba at the EU 
Council’s General Secretariat. However, the views expressed are purely those of the writer and may not in any 
circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the Council. 
    
2 All quotes from the brief on Neuber’s contribution in the introductory brochure of the Univ.of Cologne Latif 
conference 2009, p.23 (publication forthcoming) 
    
3 E.g.Gratius, Susanne, ¿Es la posición común de la UE sobre Cuba una estrategía válida? FRIDE,Madrid 2006.  
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unsustainable situation which cannot simply be blamed on the US embargo policy.
4
         The EU has become Cuba's largest trading partner with a third of all trade, almost one half 
of foreign direct investment and more than half of all tourists coming from Europe. 42% of 
Cuban exports to developed countries (1.8 billion $) go to the EU, some 65% of Cuban imports 
from these (3.5 billion $) come from Europe. Of course, these figures are changing with the 
growing presence of countries like Brazil, Venezuela, China etc, but also of the USA (agricultural 
exports to Cuba of 0.7 billion $). Spain is the only EU country among the top five trading 
partners. Spain and the Netherlands (historically important for the Nickel trade) account for 60% 
of EU trade with Cuba. Ten MS signed an investment protection agreement with Havana. Cuba 
benefits from the Generalised System of Preferences by which the EU unilaterally grants tax-free 
access for many products on its market. 
  From the 
early days, Cuba was highly vulnerable and dependent of important external assistance. Thus, 
humanitarian aid dominated early EU assistance which contrary to US aid is normally given free 
of political considerations. 
 
4. The Common Position vs. the US Helms-Burton law 
 
EU relations with Cuba are based on the CP adopted by the Council in late 1996; it is a  rarely 
used legal instrument of the CFSP binding all member states
5
        It is true that the initiative for a CP was launched jointly by Spain under Aznar and US 
Ambassador Eisensztat,
.  It was adopted by consensus – as 
all of its consecutive evaluations or related Council conclusions -, but with visible traces of 
different positions among MS, even before the accession of ex-Communist states.  
6 but the approach in the CP has many fathers and is clearly different 
from the objectives, tone and means of the US Helms-Burton and related embargo legislation.
7
Discussions and contacts started earlier, with a letter by Cuban Foreign Minister Robaina in late 
1987 suggesting political dialogue. On 30 May 1994, the EU agreed guidelines to engage in a 
continuing dialogue with all sectors of the Cuban society and Cuban authorities. A Commission 
communication (see EU Council doc. 8792/95) and EU Council conclusions of 17 July 1995 
finally led to Council conclusions on 2 October 1995 (Council doc. 10204/95) “to establish a 
dialogue with its Cuban interlocutors in order to determine the appropriate framework and level 
for future relations…” A troika at political directors’ level visited Cuba in November 1995, saw 
numerous Cuban ministries, the Central Bank, met with Fidel as well as with representatives of 
the opposition and reported back, at this stage in a rather promising tone. The Madrid European 
Council of 14-15 December 1995 asked the Commission to present draft negotiating directives 
for an economic and trade cooperation agreement. On his own, Commissionar Marín went to 
Cuba trying to harvest further progress. These contacts were not fruitful. Marín felt rebuffed by 
Fidel and decided not to submit draft negotiating directives to the Council, reduced the so far 
generous humanitarian aid and took the competence for Cuba out of DG “External relations” and 
placed it under DG “Development.” Also, the “avioneta-” incident of February 1996 – rumours 
have it might have been provoked by hardliners on both sides to disturb the process (as happened 
later again) - made negotiations as planned impossible. However, Marin suggested deepening the 
   
                                                            
    
4 Debts in convertible currencies were estimated  by BIS (2004) at 13.3 billion $, in non-convertible ones over 22. 
Figures vary considerably according to the methods. See an overall economic picture by Mesa Lago, Carmelo, La 
economía cubana en la encrucijada, in:Boletín Elcano, Madrid (2008), vol.102. 
    
5  Official Journal of the EU, series L  nr.322, 12.12.1996,p.1 
    
6  See the interesting  comparison in El País, 17.11.1996. 
    
7 On EU and US positions and their evolution see Joaquín Roy(Prof.EU Center of Excellence,  University of Miami) 
and his numerous publications; recently: The Cuban Revolution (1959-2009): Relations with Spain, the EU, and the 
US. 2009. Among the many critical assessments of the “Helms-Burton Act” of 1996 and the US trade embargo since 
1962, see also Erikson, Daniel, The Cuba Wars,2009; Colvin, Jake, The case for a new Cuba policy,2009; Perl, 
Shoshana, Transatlantic dispute settlement: two-level games and the Helms-Burton Act. LSE Ph.D. June 2005  
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dialogue (see Council doc. 7500/96). The European Council of 21-22 June 1996 in Florence 
regretted that the political circumstances in Cuba had not allowed to advance relations, but 
expressed hope the necessary conditions would be created. The next European Council in Dublin, 
on 13-14 December 1996, right after the adoption of the CP, expressed its wish to see progress 
towards a peaceful transition to pluralist democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in Cuba, as well as economic policies to bring about a sustainable recovery and an 
improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people. It supported a “result-oriented 
dialogue” and considered the negotiation of a cooperation agreement possible. “Any agreement 
would, in accordance with EU practice, contain a suspension clause in the event of serious breach 
of the human rights provisions.” 
        Hence, critique -yes, but no threat, no singling out of Cuba (except by the instrument of a 
CP), plus offer to support efforts.  It was the unsatisfactory situation in Cuba which led to the CP.  
This is not the place to extend on all aspects of the US policy meant to isolate and bring down the 
Cuban leadership, and force system and regime change notably by economic embargo measures. 
The EU considers such legislation as bilateral matter between the USA and Cuba, but it explicitly 
opted for “constructive engagement” and like nearly all countries of the world, it has strongly 
reacted against aspects which the EU considers incompatible with international norms, including 
through consistent voting in the UNGA on anti-Helms-Burton resolutions.  
        Inter alia, Helms-Burton tries to prevent any trade with Cuba by firms of whatever origin 
doing business in the US, and allows US citizens to file lawsuits for damages against foreign 
companies investing in confiscated US (including Cuban-American) property in Cuba. 
Absurdities went to threatening hotel chains which hosted Cuban delegations at international 
conferences. Entry to the US of key executives and shareholders of such companies is refused or 
sanctioned.  
        The EU considers these measures as contrary to US obligations under the WTO Agreements, 
and notably rejects their extraterritorial effects in contradiction with international law. To resolve 
the dispute, at the 18 May 1998 EU-US Summit in London, the EU and the US reached a 
precarious  understanding:  
        The EU suspends its WTO case, as long as the US abstain from taking action against EU 
companies or individuals, through waivers from Title IV (visa restrictions) and Title III (waivers 
from lawsuits against "trafficking in expropriated property"). Successive waivers from Title III 
have regularly been granted, but neither a permanent waiver nor waivers from Title IV. 
Resistance in Congress was too strong. At times European firms were indeed victims of financial 
sanctions by US authorities, most of them did not want to raise the issue with the European 
Commission, though the EU had immediately adopted legislative measures to protect its firms 
and citizens and even prohibiting them to obey to US sanctions.
8
 
 Some took actions: Austria 
intervened successfully when the US tried to force the BAWAG bank to cancel accounts of 
Cuban embassies. 
The EU reserves its right to re-launch the WTO procedure 
 
Besides critique of some aspects of the internal situation in Cuba 
9
                                                            
    
8 Joint action and Regulation (EC) No.2271/96 adopted by the Council on 22 November 1996 that is before the CP. 
, the CP is a typical instruments 
of a soft power which has no Cuban diaspora with strong political influence as in the USA: 
prevalence of explicit non-interference, instead of threats an offer of dialogue and cooperation. 
Sanctions are not really part of the EU’s political culture, different interests among 27 MS make 
    
9 See the former head of the Commission’s office in Cuba, Kühn von Burgsdorff, Sven, Promoting democracy and 
respect for human rights in authoritarian regimes- lessons for the CFSP policy of the EU, EU fellow 2008 at the U. of 
Miami.  
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such decisions difficult. Anyway, history shows that most sanctions have little effect.
10
    To interpret a text, it is always best to read its essential messages and terms. For the CP, these 
are (italics added): 
 And, to 
use a pun: whereas the US demonised Cuba as part of an “axis of evil”, the EU’s approach 
towards difficult partners is more to get “access to evil”.  
 
    1. “The objective of the EU…is to encourage a process of transition to pluralist democracy and 
the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable recovery and 
improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people. A transition would most likely be 
peaceful if the present regime were itself to initiate or permit such a process. It is not the policy of 
the European Union to try to bring about change by coercive measures with the effect of 
increasing the economic hardship of the Cuban people. 
    2….The EU considers that full  cooperation with Cuba will depend upon improvements in 
human rights and political freedom… 
    3. In order to facilitate peaceful change in Cuba, the EU 
        a) will intensify the present dialogue with the Cuban authorities and with all sectors of 
Cuban society… 
        c) will encourage the reform of internal legislation concerning political and civil rights…. 
        d) will evaluate developments in Cuban internal and foreign affairs according to the same 
standards that apply to EU relations with other countries… 
       e) will remain willing in the meantime…to provide ad hoc humanitarian aid… 
       f) will remain willing... also to carry out focused economic cooperation actions” 
  
       The EU commitments under point 3 of the CP are better characterised as aims-oriented than 
as “conditional”. While one may understand that Cuba does not appreciate the critique of some 
internal aspects, this text is a far cry from “interference” and clearly not of the same nature as the 
US approach. There are clear  offers  of dialogue and cooperation: in particular, only full 
cooperation is linked to, some say “conditioned by”, reforms and advance in Cuba - and what is 
less than “full” cooperation is a matter of definition. Chaotic changes were never on the agenda.
11
The CP also avoids for example the term “market economy” and refers in a more neutral way to 
(indispensable) economic reforms. Of course, the EU insisted regularly on granting civil liberties 
and releasing all political prisoners.  
  
        Dialogue turned out to be difficult. In 1999, a new troika mission was suggested, but 
postponed to march 2000 after the Ibero-American Summit. This mission was cancelled by Cuba 
in the very last moment. It took Belgium’s traditionally good contacts and skills   to renew: Vice-
president and Foreign Minister Louis Michel held exploratory talks in August 2001; at contacts in 
November between the EU Troika and Cuban FM Perez Roque in the margin of UNGA in New 
York, agreement to resume dialogue was reached. The Belgian Secretary General of Foreign 
Affairs led a troika to Havana for talks on 1-2 December. Both sides “welcomed an enlarged 
political dialogue, open and without conditions, in the respect of respective differences, and 
future-oriented.” A ministerial meeting was held on 4 December 2002 in Copenhagen. The events 
in spring 2003 put an end to dialogue. 
                                                            
    
10 General assessment on EU sanctions policy in my EU Council colleague’s excellent study Hazelzet, Hadewijch, 
Carrots or sticks? EU and US reactions to human rights violations (1989-2001),European University Institute PH.D. 
dissertation, Fiesole 2001; and Kreutz, Joakim  , Hard measures by a soft power? Sanctions policy of the EU 1981-
2004,Bonn International Centre for Conversion paper 45,2005   
    
11 Commissioner Patten stated that promoting democracy is not like making instant coffee nor can it be imposed by 
force. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner underlined it takes patience, and genuine transition can only come from within. 
Quoted in: Criado Alonso,F., La política de democratización del la UE y el caso de Cuba, in: Revista de estudios 
políticos, (142:2008),p.19f.  
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         In bilateral ministerial contacts in 2005, FM Perez Roque suggested to replace the CP by 
such political dialogue as first step towards an agreement – it was not taken up seriously.  
 
5. Cuba and the EU-ACP framework 
 
Cuba had been observer to the ACP group (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) since 1998. On 14 
December 2ooo, the ACP Council of Ministers accepted Cuba as 78
th member of the ACP group, 
the first not to be also party to the ACP-EU agreements. The ACP supported a Cuban demand to 
adhere to the EU-ACP Cotonou agreement. This would have been somewhat in line with 
Commissioner Marín’s decision to place Cuba under DG DEV. Yet, accession must be approved 
by the ACP-EC Council of Ministers by common agreement,
12
        End of 2002, Cuba requested to assist the EU-ACP negotiations as an observer, again with 
an intention to become member. Again, no unanimity within the EU Council who however “had 
no objections” to Cuba participating, as special guest of the ACP presidency at the EU-ACP 
Council June 2002 in the Dominican Republic, as well as at the opening of  negotiations in 
September.  
  and the EU Council acts by 
unanimity.  Some MS blocked this, arguing that Cuba does not fulfil the Human Rights and 
democracy clause of the agreement; some observers asked if all other ACP do, and if Cuba does 
not stand out at least as concerns access of citizens to health and education? EU representatives 
have indeed recognised this in their contacts. Also, the procedures in the agreement’s art. 9 and 
96 procedures are only applicable once it is a member. Cuba had insisted that the EU establish no 
pre-conditions to a possible request to accession.  It withdrew its candidature in April, faced with 
opposition by some MS. 
These may have been missed occasions to integrate Cuba in a framework of the EU with similar 
countries, and an example of inconsistency: in the 14
th evaluation of the CP in June 2004, the 
Council reiterated the EU’s constructive engagement and rejected isolation  of Cuba since it 
would not contribute to this effort.(Council doc.10183/04). Cuba continued to be the only LAC 
country with which the EU has no contractual relations. But from the start of EU-LAC summits 
1999, it participated; Fidel himself  spoke at the first such summit in Rio (and respected the 7 
minutes granted for each head of state and government). 
 
6. EU cooperation with Cuba until 2003 
 
The Common Position sets as a major objective of the EU to encourage sustainable recovery and 
improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people. 
 
        a) Bases, principles and procedures of EU cooperation
13
EU cooperation has undergone changes to adapt to new situations and challenges, and to improve 
coordination with MS and  international donors. According to art.177 ECT, the European 
Community (EC) shall foster sustainable economic and social development, smooth and gradual 
integration into the world economy and support the campaigns against poverty, and contribute to 
 
                                                            
    
12 See art. 94 and Art. 15.3 of Cotonou ,as well as Art. 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the ACP-EC Council of 
Ministers (O.J. L 43 of 14.2.2001, p.2o)   
    
13  See for more details: European Commission, EC-LA development cooperation guide 2008-09; EP, The 
effectiveness of EU development cooperation with LA- assessment and perspectives. PE 385.570, April 2008; Joint 
statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the MS meeting within the Council, the EP and 
the Commission on EU Development Policy- “The European Consensus”, Council doc. 14820/05; the various annual 
reports submitted by the Commission, e.g. in Council doc. 11863/09, information on aid for trade in Council doc. 
8695/09, or on non-state actors’ involvement in EC development assistance (Council doc. 10415/09). Such documents 
are in principle accessible, in accordance with the EU’s transparency regulation (EC) no.1049/2001, in Official Journal 
L145 of 31.5.2001, which the EUCJ interprets in a very liberal way, including classified information. 
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consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and respect of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.  Main guidelines are also the UN Millennium Development Goals. The EU as a whole 
is the first global donor with 57% of official development aid flows.  The European Commission 
is mandated to manage the EC assistance budget. Programming is done in close collaboration 
with beneficiary countries and regions, which retain full sovereignty in co-deciding on priorities 
and funding; the principle of their “ownership” of the whole process is essential. MS are 
involved, they must agree to projects above a threshold with qualified majority, and the European 
Parliament plays a decisive role in the fixing of overall funds for development assistance, in 
discussing priorities and in the audit procedure. The process is thus subject to complex and 
lengthy decision, accountability and transparency rules – not comparable for example to personal, 
spontaneous decisions on aid Venezuela’s President Chavez can give on the spot e.g.in Bolivia’s 
regions. 
 
        b) EU cooperation with Cuba until 2002
14
Between 1993 and 2002, the EC alone financed € 145 million of assistance measures in Cuba, 
with 90 million in humanitarian aid.  In the mid-90’s, Cuba asked for considerable EU support to 
the limited reforms which Raúl pushed through. Since 1998 the budget lines “Co-financing of 
NGOs” and “Economic co-operation with Latin American countries” became more used, with 
18.9 M€ and 14.8 M€ 1998-2000. Successful economic reform and enhanced trade and 
investment flows depend on an efficiently operating public service both at central and local 
levels. Thus, EU economic co-operation contributed to labour laws, fiscal reforms, and financial 
management, introducing international accountancy standards, strengthening the financial sector 
through capacity building at Central Bank and commercial bank level, to enhanced business 
administration skills of Cuban executives and to contacts between European and Cuban firms. 
NGOs supported projects and partners in sectors like agriculture, health and education.  The food 
security programme provided funds of some 20 M€ , reaching half a million people.  
  
        Assistance covered also participation in programmes like INCO (network of research 
institutes), ALFA (network of universities), URBAL (network of cities) and AL-INVEST, and 
the @lis programme to support ICT development in LA, as well as urban waste management and 
a regional Caribbean  project on fight against swine fever.   
        Bilateral MS co-operation focused on support in the social sector, health, education and 
scientific co-operation, social housing, urban and rural development, environmental protection, 
humanitarian and food aid, plus public administration and trade and investment promotion, 
cultural activities and scholarships.  
        EU development assistance was thus widespread, even beyond sectors covered by the CP. 
A large amount of both bilateral and Community co-operation was channelled through 
international NGOs . They had developed particular know how and built up local partner 
structures. Yet, they reported problems in identifying relatively independent and competent actors 
amongst Cuba’s infant civil society organisations. Working with local partners became very 
difficult after 2003.  
7. The rupture in 2003 
From 2003 till early 2005, the legal CP was complemented by a political decision with rather 
mild, diplomatic “measures.” After the summary, arbitrary and severe sentences in spring 2003 of 
                                                            
     
14 The following is based on a number of internal papers of the EU-Commission or the EU Council, which in 
principle should also be accessible, such as Council doc. 10736/96 or Council AMLAT group meeting documents 
117/05, and 14/06; some of these are even found on the Commission’s website. 
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75 dissidents to 1800 years imprisonment for simply expressing their different political ideas and 
claiming certain constitutional rights (which does not justify the term “mercenaries”  usually 
reserved for armed aggressors), on 5 June 2003 the EU Council decided to : 
 
-  Limit (i.e. not exclude ) bilateral high-level governmental visits 
-  Reduce  the profile (level) of member states' participation in cultural events 
-  invite Cuban dissidents at national days celebrations. (Council doc. 9661/03, p.12) 
 
These measures were adopted without considering Clausewitz’ warning, “before entering in a 
conflict, consider how and what to get out of it.” 
15
        The Council’s 13
th evaluation of the CP adopted shortly after, stated “Funding should be 
channelled through governmental institutions only  if a direct benefit for the population or 
meaningful contribution towards economic opening and reform in Cuba is ensured” (Council 
doc.11401/03) . Fidel Castro (quoted to have said: “tanto fastidio por tan poca plata”) reacted by 
unilaterally suspending practically all aid managed directly from the EU (Commission and MS), 
thus interrupting some 22 projects from the EC alone. Only aid channelled through UN agencies , 
foundations, NGOs, solidarity movements, autonomous regions, local governments, private 
companies, etc. would be able to continue – if Havana so accepted. Project visits were no longer 
possible. Havana refused to negotiate with the EU any development co-operation aspects and 
only accepted to deal with NGOs.  But it became nearly impossible to find NGOs daring to act or 
fulfilling EU legal norms for cooperation. 
 Fidel immediately retaliated and announced 
countermeasures: freezing any contact with Cuban authorities for those embassies who would 
invite the opposition to their National Days. The “cocktail party war” brought embassies in an 
embarrassing situation and paralysed their activities.  
         In reality, very few EU countries known for more “cooperative behaviour” were allowed to 
continue. A major victim of Cuban authorities was the EC-DEADE project with MBA courses 
through the University of Havana. It was one of the most successful projects that the Commission 
had developed in Cuba, managed by a consortium of European Business Schools (Barcelona, 
Paris, London, Madrid, Lisbon, Milan and Copenhagen). Its cancellation was likely to have an 
effect on Cuba alone…Already in the 1990’s , Cuba had radically and without pre-warning 
changed its position e.g.on cooperating with European firms, by ending contracts with smaller 
firms. Such decisions are of course a sovereign right of a government, but one is entitled to 
wonder if it is in the interest of its citizens. The projects were the opposite of “injerencia” 
(interference), they would simply have contributed to the wellbeing of citizens and the 
improvement of economic and administrative performance. 
8. The suspension of the 2003 measures in early 2005 
The Cuban “bloqueo” made it very difficult to pursue the objectives of the CP, including  
interventions on behalf of political prisoners , or to do  normal business for which an embassy 
is established. Thus, following intensive internal discussions, in early 2005 Council 
unanimously took the political decision to suspend all the measures (Council doc. 5444/1/05 
REV1). Council added that at the occasion of high-level visits, the human rights situation and 
the position of the dissidents will be raised with the Cuban government and civil society, and 
that  meetings with the peaceful opposition can be part of high-level visits. (NB. This was, and 
continues to be at the discretion of visitors) 
                                                            
    
15 Habana had first rejected two EU demarches, the first non-public, and reacted with  insults and threats; see 
Council documents 8443/03, 9961/03, 10586/03 and the 13th re-evaluation of the CP on 21 July in 11401/03. Note that 
a year earlier, Fidel had personally called EU ambassadors for support  to  Pres. Chavez against the attempted coup in 
February 2002 (only Aznar had hastily recognised the putschists)  
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        The suspension of the 2003 measures should be reviewed before July 2005, in the light of 
the evolution towards democratic pluralism and the respect of human rights in Cuba. 
Council took also note of the conditional release of a limited number of the 75 political prisoners, 
but continued to urge Cuban authorities to release unconditionally  all political prisoners still 
detained. 
         The EU also undertook more intense relations with the peaceful political opposition and 
broader layers of civil society in Cuba. A comment is necessary on this cooperation: 
In some public comments and articles, misplaced emphasis was put on  the importance of 
invitations  of dissidents to National Day celebrations. These certainly more visible contacts 
should not overshadow the many other ways by which the EU holds contacts with the peaceful 
opposition. EU embassies agreed on guidelines for more regular meetings between their Human 
Rights Group and dissidents. The fact of these meetings was made public. Embassies would 
request access to prisons, improve access of dissidents to sources of information, reinforce 
relations with local independent media and libraries, and invite dissidents to cultural and social 
events, and to Europe. The EU would insist that Cuban authorities will not prohibit this, as had 
occurred. 
        It must be stressed that the EU has always taken a strong stand on the situation in Cuba in 
the Commission on Human Rights, while it also regularly supported the annual resolution in the 
UNGA against the US embargo – together with all but 2-3 countries of the world . 
 
9. The failure of a mid- and long-term strategy towards Cuba 
Efforts to establish a European “mid and long-term strategy”, as envisaged in the 16
th 
evaluation in June 2006 (Council doc.10210/06) failed and were abandoned in 2007. 
“Confidential” discussions in the Council working group were regularly leaked to news 
agencies and Cuba with considerable details, even the same day, and Cuba reacted with threats. 
In such circumstances it made no  sense to proceed. During discussions, two aspects were 
obvious: 
      -the essential aims and means of the CP were to be maintained 
      -like many in the US
16
        This failed effort can be seen as a reaction to US policy: The Commission  for 
assistance to a free Cuba set up by President George W. Bush had previously made two 
reports with recommendations for measures in line with tough US positions; the first  
looked rather like a shopping bag with sometimes absurd details and conclusions.
, most in the EU expected no short-term or chaotic, violent 
evolution, nor made it sense for them to provoke it. 
17
10. The Spanish unilateral initiative and its impact 
   
 
The CP has been re-evaluated regularly since 1996. EU-internal divergence made this exercise 
more and more cumbersome, mainly but not only because some of the ex-communist MS are 
closer to US positions on how to bring about democratic transitions. 
     N.B: Some analysts tend to overestimate Cuba’s importance for most European 
governments, others underestimate the need by some to take into account internal pressure to 
                                                            
    
16 Even “tougher” ministries like Defence and Homeland Security  spoke publicly out against evolutions which 
might lead to (another) mass exodus of Cubans to the US; note that at other occasions , numerous criminals ,disabled or 
disturbed persons were said to be among those allowed to leave Cuba.. 
    
17 Ehe first report was submitted in May 2004, the second in July 2006 . I made résumés of both; the first report 
included the expected saving of four endangered cave animal species, after “transition”.      
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do more for the Cuban people. Not only in the USA is Cuba an issue of internal politics. Also, 
policies are highly influenced by subjective interpretations of dramatic national events like 
system change and transition. Some new EU member states claimed that “their” transition 
process from communism and the US role in it alone were the path to follow (read: privileging 
civil society contacts over official ones like Brandt’s Ostpolitik). They were recalled that others 
like Spain, Greece and Portugal had made their own, each very different and successful 
transition. As a former Cuban official of the Ministry of the Interior said: “historical analogies 
are an expression of intellectual laziness. If you want to analyze Castro, you analyze Castro in 
the context of his own unique features… It’s wrong to compare him to... Stalin.”
18
        There is another problem: the EU’s credibility had suffered from inconsistent behaviour of 
some MS which had hard positions on the EU level, but maintained well-functioning bilateral 
trade relations (e.g. the Netherlands, second trade partner  among the EU). Also, at times 
hardliners on both sides behaved in a way to provoke rupture.  
  
         Madrid was certainly frustrated with the quarrel at EU level and looked for alternatives. 
When a Czech Foreign Minister twice publicly denounced the Council conclusions as 
somehow irrelevant for his country’s policies – shortly after having them approved -, Spain 
chose to go alone, a calculated risk. Madrid did not abandon the principles of the CP, but 
refused to have it mentioned. The Council conclusions on Cuba adopted in June 2007 did no 
longer refer to the CP
19
         As the Spanish unilateral approach has been discussed elsewhere, I shall not deal with it 
here.
 , and Cuba was invited to come to Brussels to sound out future steps. 
(Council doc. 10758/1/07 REV1). 
20 The moment had come when some called the CP “a common position as expression on 
no common policies.” 
21
 
 I still consider this overstated, the essentials are pursued by all, with 
different emphasis. Many are not unhappy with Spain going ahead. 
10. The way towards the resumption of dialogue and cooperation 
 
When in 2007 Fidel stepped back and put Raul in place, both sides gave signals that relations 
could resume. However, self-confident Cuba 
22
         Many analysts, parliamentarians, journalists and even some Commissioners have come to 
“copy” Cuba in calling the 2003 diplomatic measures “sanctions”. A sober look shows that it is 
 at first put forward various "conditions". Clearing 
the way from unnecessary propagandistic weeds has certainly helped preparing a less loaded 
terrain for real discussions. Some “conditions” were abandoned and “obstacles” removed through 
patient but clear informal dialogue by some EU officials undoing certain arguments as 
unjustified, unhelpful, double-edged or arbitrary. For example, “respeto" must be valid for both 
sides, insulting the EU as “lacayo" of the US is unhelpful. Or, when the EU was accused of 
double standards in human rights by singling out Cuba, reference was made to the farce some 
countries including Cuba made of the UN Council on Human Rights, or to similar “double 
standards” by the absence of e.g. a Cuban UN resolution against the Zimbabwean regime’s 
destroying its country’s potential and starving its people.  
                                                            
    
18 Quoted in Erikson, Dan, The Cuba wars. 2009,p.302 
    
19 By compromise it was maintained in  the non-public PSC minutes 
    
20 Roy (2009) 
    
21Criado, p. 25.  
    
22 Cuba has reliable international support. In 120 of the 192 UN member states, Cuba has diplomatic representation, 
103 embassies are accredited in Havana. It was elected member of the UN Council on Human Rights, presidency of the 
118-nation non-aligned movement, as well as member of the RIO Group. LA countries with little exceptions are rather 
unwilling to engage in concrete discussions on improving the internal situation in Cuba.  Its  support to decolonisation 
in Africa and external aid are legend in developing countries: more than 30 000 Cuban medical staff are present in 72 
countries, 20 000 foreign medical students are trained at no charge in Cuba. Within Venezuelan funds, Cuban doctors 
carried out 750 000 free operations abroad.  Keeping a blind eye on this is counterproductive.   
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normal practice for Cuban embassies in our countries to invite also fundamental opponents to 
Western democracies or capitalism  to receptions -without any protest by EU. By the way, in a 
pragmatic way Cubans apply different standards in this: the high US official Bisa Williams 
recently had no problem meeting with opponents - this was simply “not negotiable”-, whereas EU 
politicians and officials are requested  to abstain from such actions. The days are forgotten when 
Fidel invited the first EU Troika to lunch in 1995, immediately after their meeting with the 
opposition. Also, Canada – whose position is similar to the EU - could open various 
information centres on the island, contrary to the EU or most MS. 
        Cuba insisted that the already suspended 2003 measures be definitely eliminated. 
This was indeed agreed in the Council conclusions of mid- 2008 I admit against my 
expectations; I saw the suspended measures as a “political zombie” which could neither 
die nor live.  Cuba  knew  that the suspended measures could never be revived! It is 
important to note that different Council procedures apply: to modify or eliminate the 
legal  instrument  “Common Position”,  the necessary “unanimity” can be reached by 
“constructive abstention”
23
        As requested in the 2007 conclusions, preliminary discussions had taken place, also 
at Ministerial level and at various places, between the EU, some MS and Cuba. Council 
Conclusions of 23 June 2008  reiterated”the right of the Cuban citizens to decide 
independently about their future.” The Council “agreed to the lifting of the already 
suspended 2003 measures  as a means to facilitate the  political dialogue process and 
enable the full use of the instruments of the 1996 Common Position.” Dialogue "should 
include the whole range of potential fields of cooperation including the political, human 
rights, economic, scientific and cultural spheres". As part of a very difficult compromise, 
some MS had added, in a ministers-only session, “… the Council will proceed in June 
2009 to an evaluation of its relations with Cuba including the  effectiveness  of the 
political dialogue process. Following that date, the dialogue will continue if the Council 
decides that it has been effective, taking into account in particular the elements contained 
in para 2 above."
.  For the  2003 measures, which are a  political  decision, 
Council needs consensus, all must approve any change. Thus, the more far-reaching CP 
could, in principle, be more easily modified than the limited 2003 measures.   
24
         Following contacts at ministerial level with the EU Troika and visits by Commissioners 
L.Michel  and later K.de Gucht (both Belgian) , resumption of cooperation  was agreed  in 2008, 
envisaging 30-40 Mio. Euros. Raúl again acted in a more pragmatic way than Fidel, he saw 
necessity of some economic reforms and advantage in cooperation. Although a tropical country, 
Cuba needs to import 80% of its food, and compares badly with a near desert state like Israel. In 
addition, cooperation shall also cover now infrastructure reconstruction, disaster relief, and 
support other reforms to improve efficiency and delivery. Both sides also agreed on 
cooperation in research and technology – a field where even center-right  Länder governments 
like Bavaria saw advantage: it concluded cooperation agreements of more than 300 million Euros 
. This was de facto a veto possibility: a single MS could have stopped 
continuation of dialogue!  
                                                            
    
23 In another context I experienced legal “unanimity” by one MS saying “yes”, and the other 14 abstaining. 
    
24 The text in para 2 requested Cuba to “improve effectively the human rights situation by, inter alia, releasing 
unconditionally all political prisoners… This remains a key priority for the EU.  It also calls on the Cuban Government 
to facilitate access of international humanitarian organizations to Cuban prisons. The Council further called upon the 
Cuban authorities to ratify and implement the recently signed International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and urged again the Cuban Government to make real 
the commitment to human rights it has demonstrated through the signing of these two human rights covenants...” 
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 with the rather well developed Cuban research capacities, notably in biotech and medical 
technology. 
        Finally, the possibility of triangular cooperation in third countries is explicitly mentioned. It 
could add value, but some may see it difficult to strengthen Cuba’s image abroad with EU money. 
        Emergency and humanitarian assistance of € 4 million were immediately made after 
hurricanes Gustav and Ike, and Paloma
25.  An additional amount of € 36 million was committed 
in 2009 for cooperation in the fields of post-hurricane reconstruction and rehabilitation, food 
security, culture, climate change, renewable energy and business management. Cooperation on 
the management of prison systems, to which Foreign Minister F. Perez Roque had (somewhat 
surprisingly) been open, was shortly after flatly rejected by his successor.
26
11. Which way ahead? 
  
As said above, it has become fashionable , by Cuban and EU hardliners  as well as by some  
European analysts favourable
27
        Sine ira et studio: an elimination of the CP probably does no harm in itself. But let’s be 
clear: it does not avoid upcoming problems which could arise in negotiations on contractual 
relations. Consider three cases: 
  to closer relations, to (mis-)interpret the CP as essentially 
“conditioning”, an obstacle or superfluous. Cuba  now requests the elimination of the CP as 
“injerencia”, before negotiations on contractual relations. 
  - a simple trade agreement  would neither fulfil mutual expectations nor correspond to the 
real potential of relations.  
-  for a more elaborate agreement covering dialogue, cooperation, and trade(though 
probably not  free trade),  usually the EU must insist on a number of clauses some of which 
Cuba is unlikely to enter into or to fulfil. Might the EU be flexible notably on the usual 
obligatory clause on democracy and human rights as in EU discussions on South-Correa? 
Changing this for Cuba is unlikely; the EU Council would need unanimity. And: EU trade 
interests in Cuba are not comparable to those in South Correa. 
- coverage by the EU’s GSP- Plus scheme? The GSP scheme was unilaterally granted and 
thus did not offer long-term security for investors, and was not the contractual scheme 
Cuba looked for. Again, in GSP-Plus there would be problems with conditionality by the 
EU insisting on ratification of various  international conventions by beneficiary countries. 
   
          Yet, in the light of unexpected EU flexibility on the 2003 measures, nothing can be 
excluded, and interim or gradual solutions may be imaginable. As concerns an agreement, M. 
Perez-Stable comments: “… Vietnam accepted the democratic clause, taking in stride occasional 
reprove on human rights and even making some changes …Ordinary Vietnamese have greatly 
benefited while economic interests, not ideological crusades, guide foreign policy. Cuba can’t or 
won’t do the same. Unlike Vietnam, Cuba offers little in terms of trade and investment.” She also 
hints that insulting President Obama or the EU may win plaudits in Caracas but not in too many 
other quarters.
28
           For the record: There was a rare moment in 2009 when all member states from  both 
ends  might have  wished to abolish the CP: as said,  in the 2008 Council conclusions,  hardline 
member states had succeeded in entering the possibility of a veto on the continuation of 
dialogue with Cuba in 2009. In a somewhat unexpected move, in 2009 experts made clear that 
  
                                                            
    
25 In October 2008, Cuba relaunched discussions on cooperation with MS, but rejected humanitarian aid by the 
Czech Republic, with which relations are particularly sour. It is however noteworthy that Prague exerted its Council 
presidency in the first semester 2009 with laudable neutrality. 
    
26 He also refused to accept an EU list of political prisoners in poor health. 
    
27 out of various  articles, see Gratius, 2006.    
    
28 Perez-Stable, ibid.  
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conditioning or ending political dialogue with Cuban authorities is inconsistent with the CP – it 
would need to be changed or eliminated to do so. Thus even hardliners might have seen 
advantage in abolishing the CP- but such considerations need time to sink in.                                                                         
 
12. Final comments 
 
Raúl Castro moves in a so far stable international and internal situation, but there is 
irrepressible need for deep economic reforms, to start with. With all their courage, the Cuban 
opposition is still divided, atomised, infiltrated and cannot be compared to Solidarnosč  or 
Charter 77 etc; there are various protagonists, but no Lech Walesa for example.  
        Partisans of a tougher, “conditional” line oversee that the EU maintains full relations – 
often for economic self-interest – with some countries which do by no means better.
29
        It is common wisdom that neither the US embargo policy nor the EU’s critical 
engagement has led to any substantial change. Future "mutual irrelevance" at EU-Cuba level 
and "dedramatisation by bilateralisation" are possible evolutions. Governments in the EU or the 
US  are not keen to jeopardise political support they may need on other policies, by 
controversial change in policies towards Cuba. There still seems considerable space for 
interpretation and executive decision in the US, but for both the US and the EU, and possibly 
even LA countries, there are “limits of constructive engagement” in Cuba for the EU.
  By a 
CP, the EU does indeed single out Cuba, and this makes it easy for Havana to denounce such a 
policy together with many countries which reject moral(istic), norm-setting efforts by the West 
as interference with their national sovereignty. On the other hand: does the Cuban leadership its 
country a favour by  looking for the worst possible interpretation of a text or situation to create 
a Manichean situation, or by setting always new “obstacles” or “conditions”?  
30
The Common Position’s fate is mostly  in Cuba’s hands, maybe even “exclusively”, as 
Chancellor Merkel said to Zapatero
 
31 following some Cuban moves which Berlin considered 
unfriendly . “Cuba is not exactly a top EU priority. Cuba nonetheless struts around with an 
illusory sense of self-importance.”
32 The 2009 conclusions on Cuba were marked by anger 
about lack of reforms. Cuba has international support , but it is also weak by depending on one 
major source, Venezuela’s President Chavez, who supports Cuba with some 2 billion $ per 
year, partially in exchange for medical and educational services.
33
Finally, Cubans’ nationalist feelings -maybe more than political convictions- are an important 
fact to be taken into account for any approach; but so is generational change:  the majority of 
Cubans in both Miami and on the island are too young to have reminiscence of the glorious 
days of revolution, or any feelings of reconquista resp. irredentismo. 
 
                                                            
    
29 US historian and ex- political advisor Arthur Schlesinger, “La baie des cochons-retour sur un échec parfait”, in: Le 
Monde-Hors-série Archives (Février-mars 2008),p.8f. 
    
30 Erikson, Dan, Europe’s Cuba problem- the limits of constructive engagement, Inter-American Dialogue Sept. 15, 
2009. However, this article is not at ease: various recommendations are already reality, others contradict each other or 
seem unrealistic. 
    
31 Quoted in Pérez-Stable, Marifeli, Europe might take another step back, Miami Herald Feb.11, 2010). The author  
fully supports critical engagement! 
    
32 Ibid. 
    
33 China follows national interests more than ideological ones. However, without fanfare, Cuba’s Central Bank listed  
as “dry runs” two bonds of € 400 and 200 million at the London Stock exchange in 2006/07; for more see Morris, 
Emily, Cuba’s new relationship with foreign capital: economic policy-making since 1990, Journal of LA Studies(2008), 
vol.40, p.769-792. China, Brazil, Iran and more offered credit lines (Lauper, Richard, A revolution to repair, Financial 
Times August 19,2008,p.7)- a reason more to reject the recent Cuban term of an US-“bloqueo” which would imply 
successful full-blown isolation as during the missile crisis ; “embargo” is adequate. Meanwhile analysts  question 
Cuba’s “exceptionality”, see Kapcia,Antoni, Does Cuba fit yet or is it still ‘exceptional’?, Journal of LA Studies(2008), 
vol.40, p.627-650, and Hoffmann,Bert and Whitehead, Laurence ,(eds), Debating Cuban exceptionalism. (2008) 
London.    
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To conclude: the EU is aware that cooperation with countries like Cuba can be interpreted as 
stabilising the authorities - but we trust that economic development , influx of money, goods, 
and ideas does have a long-term impact favouring well-being, pluralism and a more democratic 
evolution. 
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